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BRIEF

appeal relates ahno:--;t entirely to the plead-

ings in the subject case and the pleadings in Civil No.
11G.:22:2, filed in the District Court of Salt Lake County,

a developn1ent of thP factual background of both cases
Is necessary.
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1

On February 28, 1955, appellant, Ple,ve C onstruetion Con1pany, entered into a contract ,,~ith Cudahy
Packing Company for the construction of an addition
to the Cudahy Plant at North Salt Lake City, l~tah.
During the construction, a fire occurred in the beef cooler
roo1n January 27, 1956. ( R. 2, 8)
Fiberglas Engineering & Supply Division of Q,yensCorning Fiberglas Corporation 'vas a subcontractor for
Ple·w·e and was engaged in the installation of fiberglass
insulation in the beef cooler room, at the time of the fire.
The fire ocurred, causing damage to equip1nent and
to a portion of Cudahy's plant, and Cudahy sued Plewe
to recover the damages suffered in the fire. (Ex.-File
No. 116,222) The Complaint stated causes of action in
contract in Count I and in negligence in Count II. In
the Answer filed by Plewe, he denied liability and specifically denied the allegations relating to exclu8ive C'Ontrol of the premises and of the 'vork on the addition, and
alleged that the premises 'Yere in possession of the plaintiff and of other contractors, and he further alleged contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
Thereafter, Ple"~e joined Fiberglas as a third party
defendant, alleging that if there "~as any liability of
Ple"'"e to Cudahy, Fiberglas, because of its subcontract
work in the area, was liable to Ple"-e. Fiberglas denied
liability and included by 'Yay of defense an allegation
that Fiberglas had paid Cudahy for a covenant not to sue
and that Ple,Ye "-as thereby barred in its third party
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<·o1nplaint. :F,ibergla~ ah~o filed a l ros~ Co1nplaint
ag·ainst C~udahy, alleging that it had paid $59,5:23.07
to Cudahy for the dan1age and for a covenant not to sue.
1

In Ans\vers to IntPrrogatories filed Octobt>r :21, 1959,
Cudahy stated that the da1nage it suffered included the
ro~t of reconditioning and repairing its o'Yn equip1nent
da1uaged by the fire, the cost of repairing it~ plant danlag(·d by the fire, and also, the loss of business and incidPntal expenses resulting fro1n a plant shut-do,vn caused
by the fir(:l. ( I~x. File No. 11(),~~:2)
Thereafter, F,iberglas' ·Cross Co1nplaint "~as disllliHsed and after considerable Pre-Trial investigation,
the case came on for a jury trial. At the trial, the jury·
"·a:-: selected and then just prior to connnence1uent of
the proof, the case 'vas settled and co1npron1ised by the
payn1ent to the plaintiff of $12,500.00. The settlement
'\'a~ n1ade by 1neans of a Judg1nent confessed to by appellant, Plewe. The Inethod of settle1nent is the n1ain
prohle1n before us on the appeal. The present action ":-as
filed by appellant, Ple,ve, against respondent, seeking rerovery of the amount paid pursuant to said settlement,
attorneys' fees incurred in the defense of the prior action,
and attorneys' fees and costs incurred in pursuing the
present action, all based on the insurance policy issued
hy respondent to appellant.
The Co1nplaint (R. 4),
Arnendment to the Complaint
to Amendment to Complaint
follo,ving material undisputed

the Ans,ver (R. 8), the
(R. 14), and the Ans,ver
(R. 20), established the
facts:
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1. That Cudahy and Ple\\·e had a construction contract under \vhich Ple"·e had performed \vork up to the
tirne of the fire; that the fire occurred January 27, 1956
in the beef cooler roon1, resulting in damages to Cudahy;
and that Cudahy asserted a claiin against I)le\Ye by filing
civil action X o. 11(),:2:2:2, to reeover damages jn the an1ount
of $119,0-1-7.:35, based upon the contractual relation:ship
bet\\·een CridaLay and l)le~,ye, a:ad also upon the
negligence of Ple,ve. (R. 2, I)ara. 3 and -!; R. 8, Para. 1)
2. That respondent \vas given a copy of the ·Coinplaint and thereafter repeatedly \vas informed of the
defense of the law suit, and \vas requested to participate
therein; that respondent refused to do so up to and
through the final negotiation and settlt~lnent of the la-'v
suit.
3. That the negligence insurance policy (Ex. 1) \Yas
in full force and effect at the tin1e of the fire.
The sante pleadings formulated the follo"ring disputed iss uP~ of fact n1aterial to the points on appeal:

1. To \vhat extent, if any, "·as the property damaged by the fire "·ithin the rare, custody or control of
appellant?
2. What notice, if any, of the fire 'vas given respondent·?
3. If inadequate notice \vas given, 'vhether or not
the notice \vas \vaived by respondent.
On April 26, 1960, a Pre Trial 'vas held before
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Honorable StP\YHl't .Jl. 1-lan~on, and a J>re rr,rial ()nlPr
'ra~ i~~uPd. (it 1 G-:20) . . \t thi~ tinlP a further I're Trial
"·a~ ~et for .Jl a~· 20, 19GO and thP ultin1atP trial for June
1;>, 1960. ~\~ a result of the .April :2() PrP-1~ rial, an
1\111enchnent to the ·Con1plaint and an ..c\n~nver to said
1\ 111Pnd1nent "·ere filed by the re~pe('tive parties. (R..
1-l-, :20) ..At the next J>re-Trial hearing on ~I a~· :20, 19GO,
of "·hich no record 'vas rnade, respondent introdurPd in
~lllJllort of its .Jlotion for Sunnnary Judg1nent, the ~nb
jP<'t insurance pol iey ( R. :2-l-) (Ex. 1), and although the
1~re-Trial Order does not so indicate and although thPre
"·a~ no record rnade of the hearing, respondent argued
that the judgrnent in the prior case, _No. 116,222, \vas
conclusive evidence of the fact of Ple,y·e's control of the
propert~· damaged by the fire. Appellant, at ~aid hearing, argued that not only the J udg1nent, but the entire
file in said exhibit should be considered by· the Court,
and further, that at the forthco1ning trial, evidence \vould
~ho'v that the property damaged \vas not under the care,
cu~tody or control of Ple,ve .

.A..t this point, Judge Hanson entered a Summar)·
J udgrnent (R. 31) indicating there "·as no rnaterial issue
of fact, but at the same time, giving no reason for his
decision and making no Findings or Conclusions from
\vhich an appeal could be taken. Thereafter, upon 1\fotion of appellant, the Court, although not delineating
the Decision as a Findings, entered a l\Iemorandum Deci~ion, setting forth "·hat it considered to be the facts
upon "·hich there was no issue and thus upon "·hich he
could grant a Summary Judgment. (R. 39-41)
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At Pages 52-62 of the record, in order to make a
· proper transcript of the proposed evidence to be offered
relating to the lack of control of the property damaged,
appellant made a proffer of proof at the hearing on the
~lotion

for X e\Y Trial. The

denied and this Appeal

\Yas

~I o6on

:F'or X P\\T Trial "Tas

taken.

STATE~IENT

OF POIX·TS

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL NO. 116,222 CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED
THAT 'THE DAMAGED PROPERTY WAS IN THE CARE,
CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF APPELLANT.
A. RESPONDENT HAS NO
UPON SAID JUDGMENT.

STANDING TO RELY

B. THE JUDGMEN'T IS BASED UPON NEGLIGENCE
AND NOT UPON CONTROL OF THE PREl\IISES OR CONTROL OF THE DAMAGED PROPERTY.
C. THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE
POLICY EXCLUSION.
D. THE JUDGMENT IS NOT CONCLUSIVELY BINDING UPON APPELLANT IN THIS CASE.
E. THE JUDGMENT HAS NO REFERENCE TO 'THE
DAMAGED PROP-ERTY.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
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ARGU~1ENT

~Phere

are t\vo ntain intPrrelated errors counnitted by
the lo,ver court 'vhiC'h have prevented appellant fro1n
having an adequate consideration of its case at the trial
level. ~rhese error8 are djseussed nuder Point~ I and II
hPlow:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE JUDGlVIENT IN CIVIL NO. 116,222 CONCLUSIVELY SHOWED
THAT 'THE DAMAGED PROPERTY WAS IN THE CARE,
CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF APPELLANT.
A. RESPONDENT HAS
UPON SAID JUDGMENT.

NO

STANDING TO

RELY

Inasn1uch as appellant has not had the opportunity
of presenting evidence on the adequacy of notice to the
insurance company, \Ye 1nust assu1ne in this Su1n1nary
J udg1nent proceeding, that the Inatter is considered in a
light most favorable to appellant. Therefore, as alleged
in the Co1nplaint, the respondent had received adequate
notice of the fire and of the proceedings undertaken by
C\1dahy. N ot,Yithstanding this notice and infor1nation,
rt}spondent refused to defend the rase or to take any
part in the preparation of the defense or in the negotiation of the ultimate settlement. Therefore, respondent,
in attempting to invoke the protection of the exclusion
clause, is in effect relying on a provision in the policy,
\\~hen it has repudiated the policy and has denied liability thereunder. This is an inconsistent position and
as indicated in Kershaw v. J.li aryland Casu.alty Co1npany,
34~ P. 2d -!2 (·Cal., 1959), untenable. The ·Court held
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8
that an insurance company could not deny liability under
a policy and in a situation, such as \Ve have here, then
invoke the protection of a clause put in the policy for its
O\Vn benefit. See also Grant v. Sun Indemnity, 80 P2nd
99G, 99·7 and Geddin and Sntilh 1:. St. Paul J! ercury
Indemnity Contpany, 334 P.2nd 881.
B. THE JUDGMEN'T IS BASED UPON NEGLIGENCE
AND NOT UPON CONTROL OF THE PREMISES OR CONTROL OF THE DAMAGED PROPERTY.

In co1npro1nising and settling the Cudahy la-\Ysuit
it is clear that the parties \Yere intending to and did
dis1niss the contractual cause of action, Count I, and
placed liability squarely upon the negligence cause of
action, Count II. The settlement and liability \Yas further narro,ved to a cause based ~'solely on the basis of
negligence .. " and the general reference to ·Count II \Yas
qualified by the specific reference to negligence liability.
Therefore only that part of Count II relating to negligence is even material here. The confession of judgment
reads in part, (Ex., File 116,222.) :
and a jur~~ haYing been en1paneled and
the plaintiff thereupon having moved to reduce the prayer of its con1plaint and to disn1iss
the first count of its co1nplaint, and to seek recovery against the defendant Plewe Construction
Compan~r on the second count of its complaint,
and solely· on the basis of the negligence of Ple\Ye
Construction Co1npany. . . "
H •••

The ele1nents of negligence to \Vhich reference is
above n1ade are found in Paragraph 7 of the first count
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and an' incorporated in the ~eeond count h~· rPference.
Paragraph 7 lists 7 individual negligent acts, any one
or rnore of "·hich allPgPdly eansed the fire. X one of thP~P
negligent aC'ts depended for its validity upon the care,
eu~~tody or control of an~· property, nor even upon the
allPgations of paragraph~ of Count II.
Paragraph~'

Count II reads as follo\\·s:

~' _1-\ t

the aforesaid tirne and prior thereto, the
\\Tork on said addition and thP prernises therPabout \\·ere under the exelusive control of the
defPndant; the said fire ?rould not hare occurrerl
in the a bse nee of n e.rJl igc uce as a fore said." (Italics
added)
This paragraph is the onl~T basis upon "·hich Respondent
can rel~T as a cause of action corning \Yithin the exclusionary language of the policy, yet the paragraph has nothing
to do \\·ith negligence. Actuall~T the part not italicized
also appears in the contractual cause of action, Paragraph 9, Count I, \Yhich Count \Yas dismissed, further
indicating lack of rnateriality to this negligence cause in
Count II. The italicized portion clearly places added
ernphasis upon the foregoing allegations of specific negligence, and negatives an~T effect the first part of the paragraph rnight concPivably have had in connection \\·ith
negligence. Unless this is an attempt to allege the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquiter, \Yhich only has presumptive
Yalue, as a matter of evidencf', it is difficult to see \Yhat
the purpose of this paragraph is at all. In any event,
there are seven different negligence situations each of
"Thich gave rise to possible liability of Plewe, and each of
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\vhich \vere independent fro1n and not affected by paragraph 2.
Appellant, however, cannot be charged in this case
\vith having control or having agreed to such a state1nent
concerning control merely because he confessed judgInent on the basis of negligence and upon the basis of
Count II. Appellant certainly did not agree to all the
facts alleged in the 10 paragraphs of Count I nor in
the 3 paragraphs in Count II, since some of the allegations relate to contractual liability and some have no
particular relationship to either contractual or tort liability. Certainly it is not reasonable to hold that this
Judgment based upon negligence is a binding stipulation
as to all matters alleged in the Complaint. This Paragraph 2 of Count II has no place in the negligence allegations, and, therefore, cannot be held to have been adInitted b~T appellant.
The background of Civil X o. 116,~:22 is i1nportant in
considering this n1atter for the reason that the legal
theorie~ in thl~ First ·Count haYe 1nateriality to the liability of :B--,iberglas as a third party defendant. The distinction bet\Yeen a rau~P of action on eontraet in the
First Count and a cause of aetion in tort on the Second
(~ount \\Tas i1nportant in thr 1nanner of final settle1nent
of the liabilities of all concerned. \Y. e cannot, therefore,
jgnor<' thP 1neaning and the reasons for the dis1nissal of
thP First Count and the responsibility of the negligence allegations in the Second Count by considering
the \vhole J udg1nent in a general n1anner \\Tithout giving
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particular consideration to the individual parts thereof
and to the particular elements of the ·Complaint referred
to therein. Therefore, the general allegation in Paragraph :2 certainly cannot be considered an adtnission conelusively binding upon appellant merely because he confessed judgnH-_•nt solely upon negligence.
C. THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT FALL WI'THIN THE
POLICY EXCLUSION.

\V. e 1nust compare the \vording of the exelusion paragraph in the policy \vith the wording of I_)aragraph 2 of

the Second ·Count.
The policy provides as follows :
~·This

policy does not apply:

(f) Under coverage C to InJury to or
destruction of ... property in the care, custody
or control of the insured."
Paragraph 2 of Count I provides:
"'At the aforesaid time, and prior therPto,
the \vork on said addition and the premises thereabouts were under the exclusive control of the dPfendant; the said fire would not have occurred
in the absence of negligencP as aforesaid.''

It is clear that Paragraph 2 is not couched in the
sa1ne ter1ns as is the policy provision. Paragraph ~
says that work on the addition is in the control of appellant. Work, of course, as it is here used, means the
actual manual effort of construction. Paragraph 2 further says that \vork on the premises or the premises
thereabout are under the control of the contractor. Can
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we infer reasonably that such a phrase conclusively
includes the plant of Cudahy, the equipn1ent of Cudahy
which was being stored by ·Cudahy in the area of the
fire, or the loss of business because of the plant being
shut do,,·n. ·Certainly such a general tern1 'vould need
an1plification in order to bring 'vithin its meaning the
property 'vhich 'vas actually damaged by the fire in this
case. The damage is not alleged in Paragraph 2 to have
resulted to property under the control of the contractor.
It is clear that the intent of Paragraph ~ is not nearly
so restricted as is the provision in the policy exclusion
clause. X evertheless~ the lo,ver court has held that such
a general statement has the san1e 1neaning as the very
narrow provision in the policy. The court holds appellant to a ver)~ strict adherence to the 'vords "~hen such
'vords do not substantiate the court\~ position. The
lo,ver court has refused to allo"'" additional evidence on
the problem of control even though the proposed evidence "~ould certainly explain the factual situation 'Yith
'" hich "·e are concerned.
The Complaint itself, therefor, does not bring the
subject matter '"ithin the restricted 1neaning of the
polic~r exclusion clause. Furthern1ore, the Interrogatories
and Ans,vers thereto in the file of Civil X o. 11G.2:22,
indicate ~lear}~~ that the da1nage to the building and to
cPrtain of thP equip1nent could not be considered as
'vithin the exclusive control of the contractor under the
1neaning of the insurance polic)~ clause. The evidence
proferred h~~ Appellant \\'"Ould also have sho,vn a compJPte lack of such control of the property.
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D. THE JUDGMENT IS NOT CONCLUSIVELY BINDING UPON APPELLANT IN THIS CASE.

In ordPr that a prior judg1nent against the insured
hP conelu~ively binding upon him in a subsequent aetion
again~t the insurer, thP issues in each action 1nust he
identical and the issue involved in the t\\·o suits rnust
have been 1naterial and necessary for recover~,. in the
prior suit. ~:\s is stated in 12:3 A.L.R. 71-l-:
''In a nu1nber of instances the vie\\' has l)een
taken that, since the issue in question involved
in the suit b)'" the injured party against the insured \Yas not 1naterial to the dPeision of that
case or 'vas not identical \\·ith the issnP in the
instant case alleged to have been detPrmined hy
the judg1nent in the prior action, the insurer could
not rel~,. upon such judgmPnt as deter1nining sueh
issue in its favor."
In the case of Braley Jfotor Co. rs. North1rest Casualty, 49 P. 2nd 911 (\Vash. 1935) the case \vent to the
jur~,. on three different conditions, only one of vvhich
involved facts placing it under the policy exclusionar~,.
clause. The Court there held that a judgment based
thereon \\·as not conclusive because recovery could have
been made upon either of the other t\vo conditions, independent of the cause \Yithin the exclusion of the policy.
~Pe also Woodn1an. z;s. Pacific lndenzuily Co., 72 P. 2nd
~3()~ (Calif. 1937), and the other cases cited in 1:23 A.L.R.
714.
Again in a n1ore recent case, J( ershaw vs. Jl!aryland
Casualty, 342 P. 2nd 72, 77 (Calif. 1959), the insurer
raised the same defense, claiming that the facts upon
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which the insured v;as found liable established conclu~ively that this liability was within the same exclusionary
language relating to control of the dan1aged property
as we have in the instant case. The insured had settled
the case after the insurer had refused to defend. So1ne
of the property as a matter of fact, according to the
co1nplaint "~as not "~ithin the control of the insured. The
co1nplaint \Yas for some $120,000 and the ~ettleinent \vas
for $12,000. The Court held that since some of the property \Vas not \vithin the control of the insured, a settlernent \vas reasonable and such a ~ettle1nent could not be
attacked upon the grounds that the suit against the insured \Yas barred conclusively by the allegation of control of the property. See also Larnzie-Estatet.;.· '0. OnznirhroJne Corp., 275 .K.Y. 42G, 10 N.E. 793.
In the instant case \Ve have seven clear allegations
of negligence, none of \Yhich depend upon the general
statement of control of the property, and each one of
\Vhich \Vould support an a\\~ard of da1nage~. Therefore \Ye
have in our ease a 1nuch ~tronger ha~i~ for holding that
thP judgn1ent is not conclusiYe than existed in any other
of the above cited cases.
E. THE JUDGMENT HAS NO REFERENCE TO THE
DAMAGED PROPERTY.

As is sho\vn in the K ershrnr ca~e, supra, a general
a ppliea tion of the exclusionary provision should not be
1na.de, but rather it n1ust be considered in tern1s of the
spPeific property da1naged "~hich \vas in the care, custody or control of the insured. Thus in the instant case,
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thP phrase Hthe "'"ork on the addition and the pre1nises
thereabout" clearly does not specif~~ that the property
dcunaged 'vas 'vithin the insured's control, in fact the
phrase is so general that it is virtually impossible to deterinine the specific property contemplated. Yet under
the cases rited above, the law is clear that insured is only
barred in its clai1n if all of the property for 'vhich judgInent or settlement was made clearly falls 'vithin the
exclusionary language.
The pleadings in Civil No. 116,222 indicate in part
sou1e of the problems 'vith 'vhich the parties "~ere faced
in deter1nining liability for the damage, to-,vit: the relationship of Fibre-Glas as a subcontractor and its part
in performing the work; the fact that Plewe had finished
'vith its 'vork in the area of the fire; the payment by
Fibre Glas of one half of the damages suffered by Cudahay; the possession and ownership by Cudahay of much
of the equipn1ent "~hich 'vas damaged and its location
"~ith reference to the fire; the location of other parts of
the Cudahay plant 'vhere the beef damaged by the fire
"?as kept; the alleged fact that parts of the plant were in
possession of Cudahay, and that other contractors together 'vith n1e1nbers of the public 'vere also on the property at the tin1e of the fire. These matters, and probably
other related matters, all had to be decided in order that
the· specific application of the exclusionary language
could be n1ade, and the property actually 'vi thin control
of the insured could be ascertained.
Because of the complexity of these factual proble1ns,
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Appellant argued that the entire file of ·Civil X o. 11G,22:2
be considered and that Appellants proposed evidence
be admitted to properly deter1nine these 1natters. Certainly as the record no'v stand:-; there are no facts, admissions or stipulations establishing that any of the
svecific items of damage '"'ere "-ithin the control of the
insured. It seems unlikely that Fibre glas 'vould have
paid some $59,000 in partial settlement of the clain1, had
the damaged property been "-ithin the control of the insured.
In vie\v of all of the above factual issues "-hich are
still unresolved is it reasonable to hold, as the trial court
has, that there are no issue of fact, and that Appellant
is not entitled to put on evidence to settle these questions?
Is it reasonable to eliminate or fail to consider the evidence \vhich n1ust be considered before the judgment can
be given any stature, even if it is conclusively binding in
son1e respects? Certainly not, and .A. ppellant should be
g1ven the opportunity to put on this ev-idence.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT A
SUl\IMARY JUDGMENT.

This Point 11 relating to ~unnnary Judgn1ent is so
inteJTPlated \vith the problen1~ di~en~sed above on the
conclusivPness of the prior judgn1ent, that Yery little
need be said here. Although it is quite fundan1ental that
j f therp are is~UP~ On lllateria} fact~, ~llll11Uary judg1nents
\vill not be granted, judg1nent \Vas granted here '"'hen
ver~" apparently there \Vere n1aterial issues of fact.
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1 his n1atter ea1ne
1

in a series of pre trial hearings at \rhieh the matter \Yas argued rather piecemeal,
at \rhieh no record of the proceedings was kept until the
ver~'" last hearing after the judgn1ent had been entered,
at ,,·hich Respondent offered parts of the evidenee, and at
\\·hich _.\ppellant stated its position indicating \\·hat
the evidence 'vould be, contrary to the statement of the
Court on page :2 (R. 40) (R. 5:2-G2). c·ertainly SU('h a
procedure has been prejudicial to the rights of _Appellant
in atte1npting to obtain a justiciable decision on the
merits.
Ul)

Ad1nittedly, if Paragraph 2 of Count II of the eolnplaint conclusively settles all issues of fact and la\\. an<l
thus bars Appellant in its recovery herein, then this
n1atter rightfully can be handled in a su1nmary fashion.
Ho\\·ever, Appellant strongly urges for the many reasons
set forth above, that evidence must be taken to properly
determine the factual issues concerning care, custody
and control of the property. The pleadings and the interrogatories in Civil No. 116,222, together \vith the
proferred evidence all point up facts 'vhich have not yet
been resolved.

SUMMARY
The confession of judgment based solely and specifically upon negligence can not now be extended to cover
so1ne indefinite cause based upon a statement "the 'vork
on said addition and the premises thereabout "'"ere under
the exclusive control of the defendant.". The statPntent
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relates to the actual labor involved and has nothing to
do with the control of any property. Even assuming that
the statement does concern itself ''Tith control of property, it certainly is not the only basis for liability, and
clearly is not the basis for negligence liability. Yet the
confession of judgment is based solely upon negligence.
Therefore unless the only cause of action upon \Yhich
recovery could be had is one clearly within the exclu~ionary language of the policy, the judgn1ent or settlement is not a bar to this suit by the insured against the
insurer. Appellant submits that such is clearly not the
case here. Furthermore, even if paragraph 2 of ·Count
II were the only cause of action upon ,v-hich recovery
could be predicated and upon wrhich judgment \Vas COnfessed, it does not of itself fall \vithin the exclusionary
language of the policy, and is meaningless \vithout further evidence to show its applicability to the actual
dan1age sought by ·Cudahay.
\\Therefore Appellant respectfully subn1its this matter should be ren1anded to the trial court for a trial on
the fact8.
Res pectf u ll ~ s u bn1i tted,
T

ED\\'"ARD \\'". CLYDE

ELLIOTT

I~EE PR~\TT

l'1 L \'"l)E and 1\IECH..:\:\[
Attorneys for . A.ppellant
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